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Abstract
Building on ideas from online convex optimization, we propose a general framework for the design
of efficient securities markets over very large outcome spaces. The challenge here is computational.
In a complete market, in which one security is offered for each outcome, the market institution can
not efficiently keep track of the transaction history or calculate security prices when the outcome space
is large. The natural solution is to restrict the space of securities to be much smaller than the outcome
space in such a way that securities can be priced efficiently. Recent research has focused on searching for
spaces of securities that can be priced efficiently by existing market mechanisms designed for operating
complete markets. While there have been some successes, much of this research has led to hardness
results.
In this paper, we take a drastically different approach. We start with an arbitrary space of securities
with bounded payoff, and establish a framework to design markets tailored to this space. We prove that
any market satisfying a set of intuitive conditions must price securities via a convex potential function
and that the space of reachable prices must be precisely the convex hull of the security payoffs. We
then show how the convex potential function can be defined in terms of an optimization over the convex
hull of the security payoffs. The optimal solution to the optimization problem gives the security prices.
Using this framework, we provide an efficient market for predicting the landing location of an object on
a sphere. In addition, we show that we can relax our “no-arbitrage” condition to design a new efficient
market maker for pair betting, which is known to be #P-hard to price using existing mechanisms. This
relaxation also allows the market maker to charge transaction fees so that the depth of the market can be
dynamically increased as the number of trades increases.
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1 Introduction
Securities markets play a fundamental role in economics and finance. A securities market offers a set of
contingent securities whose payoffs each depend on the future state of the world. For example, an Arrow-
Debreu security pays $1 if a particular state of the world is reached and $0 otherwise [2, 3]. Consider an
Arrow-Debreu security that will pay off in the event that a category 4 or higher hurricane passes through
Florida in 2011. A Florida resident who is worried about his home being damaged might buy this security as
a form of insurance to hedge his risk; if there is a hurricane powerful enough to damage his home, he will be
compensated. Additionally, a risk neutral trader who has reason to believe that the probability of a category
4 or higher hurricane landing in Florida in 2011 is p should be willing to buy this security at any price
below p (or sell it at any price above p) to capitalize his information. For this reason, the market price of the
security can be viewed as the traders’ collective estimate of how likely it is that a powerful hurricane will
occur. Securities markets thus have dual functions: risk allocation and information aggregation. Insurance
contracts, options, futures, and many other financial derivatives are examples of contingent securities.
A prediction market is a securities market primarily focused on information aggregation. For a future
event with n mutually exclusive and exhaustive possible outcomes, a typical prediction market offers n
Arrow-Debreu securities, each corresponding to a particular outcome. The prices of these securities form
a probability distribution over the outcome space of the event, and can be viewed as the traders’ collective
estimate of the likelihood of each outcome. Market-based probability estimates have proved to be accurate
in a variety of domains including business, entertainment, and politics [4, 18, 25].
Denote a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states of the world as O. A securities market is com-
plete if there are |O| − 1 linearly independent securities [2, 3, 19]. For example, a prediction market with
n Arrow-Debreu securities for an n-outcome event is complete. With a complete securities market, any
desired future payoff over the state space can be constructed by linearly combining these securities, which
allows a trader to hedge any possible risk he may have. Furthermore, traders can change the market prices to
reflect any valid probability distribution over the state space, allowing them to reveal any information. Com-
pleteness therefore provides expressiveness for both risk allocation and information aggregation, making it
a desirable property. However, completeness is not always achievable.
In many real-world settings, the state space can be exponentially large or infinite. For instance, a com-
petition among n candidates results in a state space of n! rank orders, while the future price of a stock has
an infinite state space. In such situations, operating a complete securities market is not practical due to the
notorious difficulties that humans have estimating small probabilities and the computational intractability of
managing a large security set. It is natural to offer a smaller set of structured securities instead. For example,
instead of having one security for each rank ordering, pair betting allows securities of the form “$1 if candi-
date A beats candidate B”. There has been a surge of recent research examining the tractability of running
standard prediction market mechanisms (such as the popular Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR)
market maker [14]) over combinatorial state spaces by limiting the space of available securities [22]. While
this line of research has led to a few positive results [10, 13], it has led more often to hardness results [9] or
to markets with undesirable properties such as unbounded loss of the market institution [11].
In this paper, we propose a general framework to design automated market makers for securities markets.
An automated market maker is a market institution who sets prices for each security and is always willing
to accept trades at these prices. Unlike previous research aimed at finding a space of securities that can be
efficiently priced using an existing market maker like LMSR, we start with an arbitrary space of securities
and design a new market maker tailored to this space. Our framework is therefore extremely general. Both
LMSR and Quad-SCPM [1] also fall under our framework.
We take an axiomatic approach. Given a space of securities with bounded payoff, we define a set of
intuitive conditions that a reasonable market maker should satisfy. We prove that a market maker satisfying
these conditions must price securities via a convex potential function, and that the space of reachable security
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prices must be precisely the convex hull of the security payoffs. We then incorporate ideas from online
convex optimization [16, 23] to define a convex cost function in terms of an optimization over the convex
hull of the security payoffs. The optimal solution to the optimization problem gives the security prices. With
this framework, we provide an efficient market for predicting the landing location of an object on a sphere.
We then show that we can relax our “no-arbitrage” condition to design a new efficient market maker for
pair betting, which is known to be #P-hard to price using LMSR [9]. This relaxation also allows the market
maker to charge transaction fees so that the depth of the market can be dynamically increased as the number
of trades increases, a desirable property that the extension of LMSR recently proposed by Othman et al. [21]
was specifically designed to satisfy.
Preliminaries and Related Work: A simple cost function based market maker [7, 8, 14, 15] offers |O|
Arrow-Debreu securities, each corresponding to a potential outcome of an event. The market maker deter-
mines how much each security should cost using a differentiable cost function, C : R|O| → R, which is
simply a potential function specifying the amount of money currently wagered in the market as a function
of the number of shares of each security that have been purchased. If qo is the number of shares of security
o currently held by traders, and a trader would like to purchase a bundle of ro shares for each security o ∈ O
(where some ro could be zero or even negative, representing a sale), the trader must pay C(q+ r) − C(q)
to the market maker. The instantaneous price of security o (that is, the price per share of an infinitely small
portion of a security) is then ∂C(q)/∂qo, and is denoted po(q).
The market designer is free to choose any differentiable cost function C that satisfies a few basic prop-
erties. First, it must be the case that for every o ∈ O and every q ∈ R|O|, po(q) ≥ 0. This ensures that
the price of a security is never negative. Second, if the market designer wishes to prevent arbitrage, it must
be the case that for every q ∈ R|O|, ∑
o∈O po(q) = 1. That is, the sum of the instantaneous prices of
the securities must always be 1. If the prices summed to something less than (respectively, greater than)
1, then a trader could purchase (respectively, sell) small equal quantities of each security for a guaranteed
profit.1 These conditions ensure that the current prices can always be viewed as a probability distribution
over the outcome space. One example of a cost function based market that has received considerable atten-
tion is Hanson’s Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) [7, 14, 15]. The cost function of the LMSR is
C(q) = b log
∑
o∈O e
qo/b
, where b > 0 is a parameter of the market controlling the rate at which prices
change. The corresponding price function for each security o is po(q) = ∂C(q)/∂qo = eqo/b/
∑
o
′∈O e
q
o
′/b
.
When |O| is large or infinite, calculating the cost of a purchase becomes intractable in general. Recent
research has focused on restricting the allowable securities over a combinatorial outcome space and examin-
ing whether LMSR prices can be computed efficiently in the restricted space. If the outcome space contains
n! rank orders of n competing candidates, it is #P-hard for LMSR to price pair bets (e.g., “$1 if and only
if candidate A beats candidate B”) or subset bets (e.g., “$1 if one of the candidates in subset C finishes at
position k”) [9]. If the outcome space contains 2n Boolean values of n binary base events, it is #P-hard
for LMSR to price securities on conjunctions of any two base events (e.g., “$1 if and only if a Democrat
wins Florida and Ohio”) [9]. This line of research has led to some positive results when the uncertain event
enforces particular structure on the outcome space. In particular, for a single-elimination tournament of n
teams, securities such as “$1 if and only if team A wins a kth round game” and “$1 if and only if team A
beats team B given they face off” can be priced efficiently in LMSR [10]. For a taxonomy tree on some
statistic where the value of the statistic of a parent node is the sum of those of its children, securities such as
“$1 if and only if the value of the statistic at node A belongs to [x, y]” can be priced efficiently in LMSR [13].
Our paper takes a drastically different approach. Instead of searching for supportable spaces of secu-
rities for existing market makers, we design new market makers tailored to any security space of interest.
1Othman et al. [21] recently analyzed a variation of LMSR in which ∑
o∈O
po(q) ≥ 1, violating this no-arbitrage condition.
We also explore relaxations of the no-arbitrage condition in Section 3.
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Additionally, rather than requiring that securities have a fixed $1 payoff when the underlying event happens,
we allow more general contingent securities with arbitrary efficiently computable and bounded payoffs.
This research builds upon ideas from our earlier work [8] exploring the striking mathematical connec-
tions between complete cost function based prediction markets and no-regret learning. In that work, we
first showed that any complete cost function based prediction market can be interpreted as an algorithm for
learning from expert advice by equating the set of outcomes or states of the world with the set of experts
in the learning setting, and equating trades made in the market with expert losses. Furthermore, we showed
that if the loss of the market maker is bounded, this bound can be used to derive an O(
√
T ) regret bound
for the corresponding learning algorithm. That work focused entirely on complete markets, while here we
explore how to use these connections to design new market making mechanisms for broader security spaces.
2 A New Framework for Market-Making Over Complex Security Spaces
In the complete cost function based markets described above, the market maker offers an Arrow-Debreu
security corresponding to each potential state of the world. We consider a market-design scenario where the
state space O could potentially be quite large, or even infinite, making it infeasible to run such a market.
Instead, we allow the market maker to offer a menu of K securities for some reasonably-sized K , with
the payoff of each security described by an arbitrary but efficiently-computable function ρ : O → RK+ .
Specifically, if a trader purchases a share of security i and the outcome is o, then the trader is paid ρi(o).
We call such security spaces complex. A complex security space reduces to the complete security space if
K = |O| and for each i ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, ρi(o) = 1 if and only if o is the ith outcome. We consider traders
that purchase security bundles r ∈ RK , and say that the payoff for r upon outcome o is exactly ρ(o) · r,
where ρ(o) denotes the vector of payoffs for each security for outcome o. Let ρ(O) = {ρ(o)|o ∈ O}.
We do not presuppose a cost function based market. However, in Section 2.1, we show that the use of
a convex potential function is necessary given some minor assumptions. In Section 2.2, we go on to show
how to design an appropriate cost function by employing techniques from online convex optimization.
2.1 Imposing Some Natural Restrictions on the Market Maker
In this section we introduce a sequence of conditions or axioms that one might expect a market to satisfy, and
show that these conditions lead to some natural mathematical restrictions on the costs of security bundles.
(We consider relaxations of these conditions in Section 3.) Similar conditions were suggested for complete
markets by Chen and Vaughan [8], who defined the notion of a valid cost function, and by Othman et al. [21],
who discussed properties similar to our notions of path independence and expressiveness, among others.
Imagine a sequence of traders entering the marketplace and purchasing security bundles. Let
r1, r2, r3, . . . be the sequence of security bundles purchased. After t − 1 such purchases, the tth trader
should be able to enter the marketplace and query the market maker for the cost of arbitrary bundles. The
market maker must be able to furnish a cost Cost(r|r1, . . . , rt−1) for any bundle r. If the trader chooses
to purchase rt at a cost of Cost(rt|r1, . . . , rt−1), the market maker may update the costs of each bundle
accordingly. Our first condition requires that the cost of acquiring a bundle r must be the same regardless of
how the trader splits up the purchase.
Condition 1 (Path Independence). For any r, r′, and r′′ such that r = r′ + r′′, for any r1, . . . , rt,
Cost(r|r1, . . . , rt) = Cost(r′|r1, . . . , rt) + Cost(r′′|r1, . . . , rt, r′).
It turns out that this condition alone implies that prices can be represented by a cost function C , as
illustrated in the following theorem. The proof is by induction on t.2
2All omitted proofs appear in the appendix.
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Theorem 1. Under Condition 1, there exists a cost function C : RK → R such that we may always write
Cost(rt|r1, . . . , rt−1) = C(r1 + . . .+ rt−1 + rt)− C(r1 + . . . + rt−1).
With this in mind, we drop the cumbersome Cost(r|r1, . . . , rt) notation from now on, and write the cost
of a bundle r as C(q+ r)− C(q), where q = r1 + . . . + rt is the vector of previous purchases.
Now, recall that one of the functions of a securities market is to aggregate traders’ beliefs into an ac-
curate prediction. Each trader may have his own (potentially secret) information about the future, which
we represent as a distribution p ∈ ∆|O| over the outcome space. The pricing mechanism should therefore
incentivize the traders to reveal p, while simultaneously avoid providing arbitrage opportunities. Towards
this goal, we introduce four additional conditions on our pricing mechanism.
The first condition ensures that the gradient of C is always well-defined. If we imagine that a trader
can buy or sell an arbitrarily small bundle, we would like the cost of buying and selling an infinitesimally
small quantity of any bundle to be the same. If ∇C(q) is well-defined, it can be interpreted as a vector of
instantaneous prices for each security, with ∂C(q)/∂qo representing the price per share of an infinitesimally
small amount of security o. Additionally, we can interpret ∇C(q) as the traders’ current estimates of the
expected payoff of each security, in the same way that ∂C(q)/∂qo was interpreted as the probability of
outcome o when considering the complete security space.
Condition 2 (Existence of Instantaneous Prices). C is continuous and differentiable everywhere.
The next condition encompasses the idea that the market should react to trades in a sensible way in
order to incorporate the private information of the traders. In particular, it says that the purchase of a
security bundle r should never cause the market to lower the price of r. It turns out that this condition is
closely related to incentive compatibility for a myopic trader. It is equivalent to requiring that a trader with
a distribution p ∈ ∆|O| can never find it simultaneously profitable (in expectation) to buy a bundle r or to
buy the bundle −r. In other words, there can not be more than one way to express one’s information.
Condition 3 (Information Incorporation). For any q and r ∈ RK , C(q+2r)−C(q+r) ≥ C(q+r)−C(q).
The no arbitrage condition states that it is never possible for a trader to purchase a security bundle r and
receive a positive profit regardless of the outcome.
Condition 4 (No Arbitrage). For all q, r ∈ RK , there exists an o ∈ O such that C(q+r)−C(q) ≥ r ·ρ(o).
Finally, the expressiveness condition specifies that any trader can set the market prices to reflect his
beliefs about the expected payoffs of each security if arbitrarily small portions of shares may be purchased.
Condition 5 (Expressiveness). For any p ∈ ∆|O|, ∃q ∈ RK ∪ {∞,−∞} for which ∇C(q) = Eo∼p[ρ(o)].
Let H(·) denote a convex hull. We characterize the form of the cost function under these conditions.
Theorem 2. Under Conditions 2-5, C must be convex with {∇C(q) : q ∈ RK} = H(ρ(O)).
Specifically, the existence of instantaneous prices implies that∇C(q) is well-defined. The incorporation
of information condition implies that C is convex. The convexity of C and the no arbitrage condition imply
that {∇C(q) : q ∈ RK} ⊆ H(ρ(O)). Finally, the expressiveness condition is equivalent to requiring that
H(ρ(O)) ⊆ {∇C(q) : q ∈ RK}.
This theorem tells us that to satisfy our conditions, the set of reachable prices of a market should be
exactly the convex hull of ρ(O). For complete markets, this would imply that the set of reachable prices
should be precisely the set of all probability distributions over the n outcomes.
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2.2 Designing the Cost Function via Conjugate Duality
The natural conditions we introduced above imply that to design a market for a set of K securities with
payoffs specified by an arbitrary payoff function ρ : O → RK+ , we should use a cost function based market
with a convex, differentiable cost function such that {∇C(q) : q ∈ RK} = H(ρ(O)). We now provide
a general technique that can be used to design and compare properties of cost functions that satisfy these
criteria. In order to accomplish this, we make use of tools from convex analysis.
It is well known3 that any closed, convex, differentiable function C : RK → R can be written in the
form C(q) = sup
x∈dom(R) x · q − R(x) for a strictly convex function R called the conjugate of C . (The
strict convexity of R follows from the differentiability of C .) Furthermore, any function that can be written
in this form is convex. As we will show in Section 2.3, the gradient of C can be expressed in terms of
this conjugate: ∇C(q) = argmax
x∈dom(R) x · q − R(x). To generate a convex cost function C such that
∇C(q) ∈ Π for all q for some set Π, it is therefore sufficient to choose an appropriate conjugate function
R, restrict the domain of R to Π, and define C as
C(q) = sup
x∈Π
x · q−R(x) . (1)
We call such a market a complex cost function based market. To generate a cost function C satisfying
our five conditions, we need only to set Π = H(ρ(O)) and select a strictly convex function R.
This method of defining C is convenient for several reasons. First, it leads to markets that are efficient to
implement whenever Π can be described by a polynomial number of simple constraints. Similar techniques
have been applied to design learning algorithms in the online convex optimization framework [16, 23],
where R plays the role of a regularizer, and have been shown to be efficient in a variety of combinatorial
applications, including online shortest paths, online learning of perfect matchings, and online cut set [6].
Second, it yields simple formulas for properties of markets that help us choose the best market to run. Two
of these properties, worst-case monetary loss and worst-case information loss, are analyzed below.
Note that both the LMSR and Quad-SCPM [1] are examples of complex cost function based markets,
though they are designed for the complete market setting only.
2.3 Bounding Market Maker Loss and Loss of Information
Before discussing market properties, it is useful to review some helpful properties of conjugates. The first
is a convenient duality: For any convex, closed function C , the conjugate of the conjugate of C is C itself.
This implies that if C is defined as in Equation 1, we may write R(x) = supq∈RK q · x− C(q). Since this
maximization is unconstrained, the maximum occurs when ∇C(q) = x. (Note that this may hold for many
different values of q.) Suppose for a particular pair (x∗,q∗) we have ∇C(q∗) = x∗. We can then rewrite
this equation as R(x∗) = q∗ ·x∗−C(q∗), which gives us that C(q∗) = q∗ ·x∗−R(x∗). From Equation 1,
this tells us that x∗ must be a maximizer of x · q − R(x). In fact, it is the unique maximizer due to strict
convexity. This implies, as mentioned above, that ∇C(q) = argmax
x∈Π x · q−R(x).
By a similar argument we have that for any q, if ∇R(x) = q then x maximizes x · q − R(x) and
therefore, as we have just shown, x = ∇C(q). However, the fact that x = ∇C(q) does not imply that
∇R(x) = q; in the markets we consider, it is generally the case that x = ∇C(q) for multiple q.
We also make use of the notion of Bregman divergence. The Bregman divergence with respect to a
convex function f is given by Df (x,y) := f(x) − f(y) − ∇f(y)(x − y). It is clear by convexity that
Df (x,y) ≥ 0 for all x and y.
3For a detailed discussion of convex conjugates and their properties, refer to a good text on convex optimization such as Boyd
and Vandenberghe [5] or Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal [17].
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2.3.1 Bounding the Market Maker’s Monetary Loss
When comparing market mechanisms, it is useful to consider the market maker’s worst-case monetary loss,
supq∈RK (supo∈O(ρ(o) · q)− C(q) +C(0)). This quantity is simply the worst-case difference between
the maximum amount that the market maker might have to pay the traders (sup
o∈O ρ(o) ·q) and the amount
of money collected by the market maker (C(q) − C(0)). The following theorem provides a bound on this
loss in terms of the conjugate function R.
Theorem 3. Consider any complex cost function based market with Π = H(ρ(O)). Let q denote the vector
of quantities sold and o denote the true outcome. The monetary loss of the market maker is no more than
R(ρ(o)) − min
x∈H(ρ(O))
R(x)−DR(ρ(o),∇C(q)) .
Consequently, the worst-case market maker loss is no more than sup
x∈ρ(O)R(x)−minx∈H(ρ(O))R(x).
This theorem tells us that as long as the conjugate function is bounded on H(ρ(O)), the market maker’s
worst-case loss is also bounded. Furthermore, it quantifies the intuitive notion that the market maker will
have higher profits when the distance between ρ(o) and the final vector of prices ∇C(q) is large. Viewed
another way, the market maker will pay more when ∇C(q) is a good estimate of ρ(o).
2.3.2 Bounding Information Loss
Information loss can occur when securities are sold in discrete quantities (for example, single units), as they
are in most real-world markets. Without the ability to purchase arbitrarily small bundles, traders may not be
able to change the market prices to reflect their true beliefs about the expected payoff of each security, even
if expressiveness is satisfied. We will argue that the amount of information lost is captured by the market’s
bid-ask spread for the smallest trading unit. Given some q, the current bid-ask spread of security bundle r is
defined to be (C(q+ r)− C(q))− (C(q)− C(q− r)). This is simply the difference between the current
cost of buying the bundle r and the current price at which r could be sold.
To see how the bid-ask spread relates to information loss, suppose that the current vector of quantities
sold is q. If securities must be sold in unit chunks, a rational, risk-neutral trader will not buy security i
unless she believes the expected payoff of this security is at least C(q+ ei)−C(q). Similarly, she will not
sell security i unless she believes the expected payoff is at most C(q) − C(q − ei). If her estimate of the
expected payoff of the security is between these two values, she has no incentive to buy or sell the security.
In this case, it is only possible to infer that the trader believes the true expected payoff lies somewhere in the
range [C(q)− C(q− ei), C(q+ ei)− C(q)]. The bid-ask spread is precisely the size of this range.
Intuitively, the bid-ask spread relates to the depth of the market. When the bid-ask spread is small, a
small order can change the prices of the securities dramatically. The market is shallow. When the bid-ask
spread is large, large orders may only move the prices slightly. The market is deep. The bid-ask spread
depends on how fast the instantaneous prices change. For complete markets, Chen and Pennock [7] use the
inverse of ∂2C(q)/∂q2
o
to capture this notion for each security o independently. We define a market depth
parameter, β, for our complex securities markets with twice-differentiable C in a similar spirit. We will
bound the bid-ask spread in terms of this parameter. Using the market depth parameter, it is easy to see that
there exists a clear trade-off between worst-case monetary loss and information loss.
Definition 1. For any complex cost function based market, if C is twice-differentiable, the market depth
parameter β(q) for a quantity vector q is defined as β(q) = 1/Vc(q), where Vc(q) is the largest eigenvalue
of ∇2C(q), the Hessian of C at q. The worst-case market depth is β = infq∈RK β(q).
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Let relint(Π) be the relative interior of Π. If C is twice-differentiable, then for any q such that∇C(q) ∈
relint(Π), we have a correspondence between the Hessian of C at q and the Hessian of R at ∇C(q). More
precisely, we have that u⊤∇2C(q)u = u⊤∇−2R(∇C(q))u for any u = x − x′ with x,x′ ∈ Π. (See, for
example, Gorni [12] for more.) This means that β(q) is equivalently defined as the smallest eigenvalue of
∇2R(∇C(q))|Π; that is, where we consider the second derivative only within the price region Π.
The definition of worst-case market depth implies that 1/β is an upper bound on the curvature of C ,
which implies that C is locally bounded by a quadratic with Hessian I/β. We can derive the following.
Lemma 1. Consider a complex cost function based market with worst-case market depth β. For any q and
r we have DC(q+ r,q) ≤ ‖r‖2/(2β).
It is easy to verify that the bid-ask spread can be written in terms of Bregman divergences. In particular,
C(q+ r)−C(q)− (C(q)− C(q− r)) = DC(q+ r,q) +DC(q− r,q). This implies that the worst-case
bid-ask spread of a market with market depth β can be upperbounded by a constant times 1/β. That is, as
the market depth parameter increases, the bid-ask spread must decrease. The following theorem shows that
this leads to an inherent tension between worst-case monetary loss and information loss.
Theorem 4. For any complex cost function based market with worst-case market depth β, for any r, q
meeting the conditions in Lemma 1, the bid-ask spread for bundle r with previous purchases q is no more
than 2‖r‖2/β. The worst-case monetary loss of the market maker at least β · diam2(H(ρ(O)))/8.
We can see that there is a direct trade-off between the upper bound of the bid-ask spread, which shrinks
as β grows, and the lower bound of the worst-case loss of the market maker, which grows linearly in β. This
trade-off is very intuitive. When the market is shallow (small β), small trades have a large impact on market
prices, and traders cannot purchase too many shares of the same security without paying a lot. When the
market is deep (large β), prices change slowly, allowing the market maker to gain more precise information,
but simultaneously forcing the market maker to take on more risk since many shares of a security can be
purchased at prices that are potentially too low. This trade-off can be adjusted by scaling R, which scales β.
This is analogous to adjusting the “liquidity parameter” b in the LMSR.
2.4 An Example
To illustrate the use of our framework for market design, we consider the following example. An object
orbiting the planet, perhaps a satellite, is predicted to fall to earth in the near future and will land at an
unknown location, which we would like to predict. We represent locations on the earth as unit vectors
u ∈ R3. We will design a market with three securities, each corresponding to one coordinate of the final
location of the object. In particular, security i will pay off ui + 1 dollars if the object lands in location
u. (The addition of 1, while not strictly necessary, ensures that the payoffs, and therefore prices, remain
positive, though it will be necessary for traders to sell securities to express certain beliefs.) This means that
traders can purchase security bundles r ∈ R3 and, when the object lands at a location u, receive a payoff
(u+ 1) · r. Note that in this example, the outcome space is infinite, but the security space is small.
The price space H(ρ(O)) for this market will be the 2-norm unit ball centered at 1. To construct a
market for this scenario, let us make the simple choice of R(x) = λ‖x − 1‖2 for some parameter λ > 0.
When ‖q‖ ≤ 2λ, there exists an x such that ∇R(x) = q. In particular, this is true for x = (1/2)q/λ + 1,
and q · x − R(x) is minimized at this point. When ‖q‖ > 2λ, q · x − R(x) is minimized at an x on the
boundary of H(ρ(O)). Specifically, it is minimized at x = q/||q|| + 1. From this, we can compute
C(q) =
{
1
4λ‖q‖2 + q · 1, when ‖q‖ ≤ 2λ,
‖q‖+ q · 1− λ, when ‖q‖ > 2λ.
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The market depth parameter β is 2λ; in fact, β(x) = 2λ for any price vector x in the interior of H(ρ(O)).
By Theorem 3, the worst-case loss of the market maker is no more than λ, which is precisely the lower
bound implied by Theorem 4. Finally, the divergence DC(q+ r,q) ≤ ‖r‖2/(4λ) for all q, r, with equality
when ‖q‖, ‖q + r‖ ≤ 2λ, implying that the bid-ask spread scales linearly with ‖r‖2/λ.
3 Relaxing the Feasible Price Region
Thus far, we have argued that the space of feasible price vectors should be precisely H(ρ(O)). In this
section, we consider more general price spaces. This generalization can be beneficial when dealing with
security spaces for which the convex hull H(ρ(O)) is difficult to optimize over directly. It also enables the
design of markets that grow increasingly deep without requiring a sacrifice in terms of worst-case loss.
As before, each market will be defined in terms of a pair (Π, R) where Π ⊆ Rd is a convex compact set
of feasible prices and R : Rd → R is a strictly convex function with domain Π. The market’s cost function
C will be the conjugate of R with respect to the set Π, as in Equation 1. The only difference is that we now
allow Π to be distinct from H(ρ(O)). Not surprisingly, the choice of Π will affect the interest of the traders
and the market maker. We prove several claims which will aid us in our market design. Proposition 1 tells
us that the expressiveness condition should not be relaxed, while Proposition 2 tells us that the no-arbitrage
condition can be. Together, these imply that we may safely choose Π to be a superset of H(ρ(O)).
Proposition 1. For any complex cost function based market, the worst-case loss of the market maker is
unbounded if ρ(O) * Π.
This (perhaps surprising) proposition tells us that expressiveness is not only useful for information ag-
gregation, it is actually necessary for the market maker to avoid unbounded loss. The proof involves showing
that if o is the final outcome and ρ(o) 6∈ Π, then it is possible to make an infinite sequence of trades such
that each trade causes a constant amount of loss to the market maker.
In the following proposition, which is a simple extension of Theorem 3, we see that including additional
price vectors in Π does not adversely impact the market maker’s worst-case loss, despite the fact that the
no-arbitrage condition is violated.
Proposition 2. Consider any complex cost function based market with R and Π satisfying
sup
x∈H(ρ(O))R(x) < ∞ and H(ρ(O)) ⊆ Π. Assume that the initial price vector satisfies ∇C(0) ∈
H(ρ(O)). Let q denote the vector of quantities sold and o denote the true outcome. The monetary loss of
the market maker is no more than R(ρ(o)) −minx∈H(ρ(O))R(x)−DR(ρ(o),∇C(q)).
This tells us that expanding Π can only help the market maker; increasing the range of ∇C(q) can
only increase the divergence term. This may seem somewhat counterintuitive. We originally required that
Π ⊆ H(ρ(O)) as a consequence of the no-arbitrage condition, and by relaxing this condition, we are
providing traders with potential arbitrage opportunities. However, these arbitrage opportunities do not hurt
the market maker. As long as the initial price vector lies inH(ρ(O)), any such situations where a trader can
earn a guaranteed profit are effectively created (and paid for) by other traders! In fact, if the final price vector
∇C(q) falls outside the convex hull, the divergence term will be strictly positive, improving the bound.
To elaborate on this point, let’s consider an example where Π is strictly larger than H(ρ(O)). Let q be
the current vector of purchases, and assume the associated price vector x = ∇C(q) lies in the interior of
H(ρ(O)). Consider a trader who purchases a bundle r such that the new price vector leaves this set, i.e.,
y := ∇C(q+ r) /∈ H(ρ(O)). We claim that this choice can be strictly improved in the sense that there is
an alternative bundle r′ whose associated profit, for any outcome o, is strictly greater than the profit for r.
For simplicity, assume y is an interior point of Π \ H(ρ(O)) so that q + r = ∇R(y). Define
π(y) := argminy′∈H(ρ(O))DR(y
′,y), the minimum divergence projection of y into H(ρ(O)). The al-
ternative bundle we consider is r′ = ∇R(π(y))−q. Our trader pays C(q+ r)−C(q+ r′) less to purchase
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r′ than to purchase r. Hence, for any outcome o, we see that the increased profit for r′ over r is
ρ(o) · (r′ − r)− C(q+ r′) + C(q+ r) > ρ(o) · (r′ − r) +∇C(q+ r′) · (r− r′)
= (ρ(o) − π(y)) · (r′ − r). (2)
Notice that we achieve strict inequality precisely because∇C(q+r′) 6= ∇C(q+r). Now use the optimality
condition for π(y) to see that, since ρ(o) ∈ H(ρ(O)), ∇pi(y)(DR(π(y),y)) · (ρ(o)− π(y)) ≥ 0. It is easy
to check that ∇pi(y)(DR(π(y),y)) = ∇R(π(y)) −∇R(y) = r′ − r. Combining this last expression with
the inequality above and (2) tells us that the profit increase is strictly greater than (ρ(o)−π(y))·(r′−r) ≥ 0.
Simply put, the trader receives a guaranteed positive increase in profit for any outcome o.
The next proposition shows that any time the price vector lies outside of ρ(o), traders could profit by
moving it back inside. The proof uses a nice application of minimax duality for convex-concave functions.
Proposition 3. For any complex cost function based market, given a current quantity vector q0 with cur-
rent price vector ∇C(q0) = x0, a trader has the opportunity to earn a guaranteed profit of at least
minx∈H(ρ(O))DR(x,x0).
In the case that x0 ∈ H(ρ(O)), DR(x,x0) is minimized when x = x0 and the bound is vacuous, as we
would expect. The more interesting case occurs when the prices have fallen outside of H(ρ(O)), in which
case a trader is guaranteed a riskless profit by moving the price vector to the closest point in H(ρ(O)).
3.1 Pair-betting Market via Relaxation
We now turn our attention to the design of a prediction market for the scenario in which the outcome is some
ranking of a set of n competitors, such as n horses in a race. The outcome of such a race is a permutation
π : [n] → [n], where π(i) is the final position of i, with π(i) = 1 being best, and [n] denotes the set
{1, · · · , n}. A typical market for this setting might offer n Arrow-Debreu securities, with the ith security
paying off if and only if π(i) = 1. Additionally, there might be a separate, independent markets allowing
bets on horses to place (come in first or second) or show (come in first, second, or third). However, running
independent markets for sets of outcomes with clear correlations is wasteful in that information revealed in
one market does not automatically propagate to the others. Instead, we consider a complex market in which
bettors can make arbitrary pair bets: for every i, j, a bettor can purchase a security which pays out if and
only if π(i) > π(j). Pricing such bets using LMSR is known to be #P-hard [9].
We can represent the payoff structure of any such outcome π by a matrix Mpi defined by
Mpi(i, j) =


1, if π(i) > π(j)
1
2 , if i = j
0, if π(i) < π(j).
We would like to choose our feasible price region as the set H({Mpi : π ∈ Sn}), where Sn is the set of
permutations on [n]. Unfortunately, the computation of this convex hull is necessarily hard: if given only a
separation oracle for the setH({Mpi : π ∈ Sn}), we could construct a linear program to solve the “minimum
feedback arcset” problem, which is known to be NP-hard.
On the positive side, we see from the previous section that the market maker can work in a larger feasible
price space without risking a larger loss. We thus relax our feasible price region Π to the set of matrices
X ∈ Rn2 satisfying
X(i, j) ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ [n]
X(i, j) = 1−X(j, i) ∀i, j ∈ [n]
X(i, j) +X(j, k) +X(k, i) ≥ 1 ∀i, j, k ∈ [n]
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This relaxation was first discussed by Meggido [20], who referred to such matrices as generalized order
matrices. He proved that, for n ≤ 4, we do have Π = H({Mpi : π ∈ Sn}), but gave a counterexample
showing strict containment for n = 13. By using this relaxed price space, the market maker allows traders
to bring the price vector outside of the convex hull, yet includes a set of basic (and natural) constraints on the
prices. Such a market could be implemented with any strongly convex conjugate function (e.g., quadratic).
3.2 Transaction Costs via Relaxation
Let us return our attention to Proposition 2, which bounds the worst-case loss of the market maker. Notice
the term R(ρ(o))−minx∈ΠR(x) is strictly positive, and accounts for the market maker’s risk in offering the
market. On the other hand, the term −DR(ρ(o),∇C(q)) is non-positive, representing the potential profit
that the market maker can earn if the final price vector ∇C(q) is far from ρ(o). The potential to make a
profit may be appealing, but note that this term will approach 0 if ∇C(q) approaches ρ(o) as traders gain
information. (Consider the behavior of traders in an election market as votes start to be tallied.) As discussed
in Section 2.3.2, the market maker can reduce his worst-case loss by adjusting the depth parameter, but this
will result in a shallow market with a larger bid-ask spread.
To combat these problems, we propose a technique that allows us to guarantee lower worst-case loss
without creating a shallow market by relaxing the feasible price region Π. This relaxation is akin to intro-
ducing a transaction cost. By constructing the correct conjugate function, we may obtain a market with a
bounded worst-case loss, a potential profit, and market depth that grows with the number of trades.
For simplicity, we consider the complete market scenario in which the marker maker offers an Arrow-
Debreu security for every outcome. Let oi denote outcome i and |O| = n. In this case, ρ(oi) = ei, and
H(ρ(O)) = ∆n, the n-simplex. We define Π := {x ∈ Rn : xi ≥ 0 ∀i, 1 ≤
∑n
j=1 xj ≤ 1 + c}, where
c is some maximal transaction cost. The transaction cost is not imposed on individual traders or individual
securities, but is split among all securities. We also introduce the requirement that traders can only purchase
positive bundles r ∈ Rn+. In general, this restriction could prevent the traders from expressing “negative”
beliefs, as we are disallowing the explicit shorting of securities, but in this particular market traders still
have the ability to effectively short a security by purchasing equal quantities of the other n− 1 securities.
We must now choose any conjugate function R satisfying the the following conditions:
1. R grows no larger than a constant within ∆n, so the worst-case loss R(ei)−R(x0) remains small.
2. Outside of ∆n, R(x) becomes increasingly curved as x approaches the constraint
∑n
j=1 xj = 1 + c.
(Notice that the price vector x is guaranteed to approach this constraint as purchases are made since we
allow only positive bundles to be purchased and thus q can only grow.) Hence, the smallest eigenvalue
of ∇2R(x), which is the market depth at x, must grow large as x approaches this boundary.
The construction we have proposed here has several nice properties. It has bounded worst-case loss
due to condition 1, and increasing market depth by condition 2. It imposes a transaction cost by letting the
prices leave the simplex, but it does so in a smooth fashion; the sum of prices only approaches the value
1 + c after many trades have occurred, and at this point the market depth will have become large. Lastly,
as a result of condition 2, we know that the market maker’s earnings increase as more trades occur, since
minx′∈H(ρ(O))DR(x
′,x) must eventually increase as the price vector x approaches the 1 + c constraint.
The idea of introducing transaction costs to allow increasing market depth was also proposed by
Othman et al. [21], who introduced a modified LMSR market maker with a particular cost function C .
Their market can be viewed as a special case of our approach, although it is not defined via conjugate
duality. In particular, they set the feasible price region of their market maker as a convex subset of
{x ∈ Rn : xi ≥ 0 ∀i, 1 ≤
∑n
j=1 xj ≤ 1 + αn log n} for a positive parameter α.
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Appendix
Below we provide all proofs that were omitted from the paper.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Let C(q) := Cost(q|∅). We shall prove, via induction, that for any t and any bundle sequence r1, . . . , rt,
Cost(rt|r1, . . . , rt−1) = C(r1 + . . . + rt−1 + rt)− C(r1 + . . .+ rt−1) . (3)
When t = 1, this holds trivially. Assume that Equation 3 holds for all bundle sequences of any length
t ≤ T . By Condition 1,
Cost(rT+1|r1, . . . , rT )
= Cost(rT+1 + rT |r1, . . . , rT−1)− Cost(rT |r1, . . . , rT−1)
= C
(
rT+1 + rT +
T−1∑
t=1
rt
)
−C
(
T−1∑
t=1
rt
)
−
(
C
(
rT +
T−1∑
t=1
rt
)
− C
(
T−1∑
t=1
rt
))
= C
(
T+1∑
t=1
rt
)
− C
(
T∑
t=1
rt
)
,
and we see that Equation 3 holds for t = T + 1 too.
3.4 Proof of Theorem 2
We first prove convexity. Assume C is non-convex somewhere. Then there must exist some q and r such
that C(q) > (1/2)C(q + r) + (1/2)C(q − r). This means C(q+ r)−C(q) < C(q)− C(q− r), which
contradicts Condition 3, so C must be convex.
Now, Condition 2 trivially guarantees that ∇C(q) is well-defined for any q. To see that {∇C(q) :
q ∈ RK} ⊆ H(ρ(O)), let us assume there exists some q′ for which ∇C(q′) /∈ H(ρ(O)). This can be
reformulated in the following way: There must exists some halfspace, defined by a normal vector r, that
separates ∇C(q′) from every member of ρ(O). More precisely
∇C(q′) /∈ H(ρ(O)) ⇐⇒ ∃r∀o ∈ O : ∇C(q′) · r ≤ ρ(o) · r.
On the other hand, letting q := q′ − r, we see by convexity of C that C(q + r) − C(q) ≤ ∇C(q′) ·
r. Combining these last two inequalities, we see that the price of bundle r purchased with history q is
always smaller than the payoff for any outcome. This implies that there exists some arbitrage opportunity,
contradicting Condition 4.
Finally, since H(ρ(O) = {Eo∼p[ρ(o)]|p ∈ ∆|O|}, Condition 5 implies that H(ρ(O)) ⊆ {∇C(q) :
q ∈ RK}.
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3.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Since q is the final quantity vector, ∇C(q) is the final vector of instantaneous prices. From Equation 1, we
have that C(q) = ∇C(q) ·q−R(∇C(q)) and C(0) = −minx∈H(ρ(O))R(x). The difference between the
amount that the market maker must pay out and the amount that the market maker has previously collected
is then
ρ(o) · q− C(q) + C(0)
= ρ(o) · q− (∇C(q) · q−R(∇C(q))) − min
x∈H(ρ(O))
R(x)
= q · (ρ(o)−∇C(q)) +R(∇C(q))− min
x∈H(ρ(O))
R(x) +R(ρ(o))−R(ρ(o))
= R(ρ(o)) − min
x∈H(ρ(O))
R(x)− (R(ρ(o)) −R(∇C(q))− q · (ρ(o)−∇C(q)))
≤ R(ρ(o)) − min
x∈H(ρ(O))
R(x)− (R(ρ(o)) −R(∇C(q))−∇R(∇C(q)) · (ρ(o) −∇C(q)))
= R(ρ(o)) − min
x∈H(ρ(O))
R(x)−DR(ρ(o),∇C(q)) ,
where DR is the Bregman divergence with respect to R, as defined above. The inequality follows from the
first-order optimality condition for convex optimization:
x = arg min
x′∈Π
f(x′) =⇒ ∇f(x) · (y − x) ≥ 0 for any y ∈ Π.
Since the divergence is always nonnegative, this is upperbounded by R(ρ(o)) − minx∈H(ρ(O))R(x),
which is in turn upperbounded by sup
x∈ρ(O)R(x)−minx∈H(ρ(O))R(x).
3.6 Proof of Theorem 4
The bound on the bid-ask spread follows immediately from Lemma 1 and the argument above. The value
β lower-bounds the eigenvalues of R everywhere on Π. Hence, if we do a quadratic lower-bound of R
from the point x0 = argminx∈ΠR(x) with Hessian defined by βI , then we see that R(x) − R(x0) ≥
DR(x,x0) ≥ β2 ‖x− x0‖2. In the worst-case, ‖x− x0‖ = diam(H(ρ(O)))/2, which finishes the proof.
3.7 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider some outcome o such that ρ(o) /∈ Π. The feasible price set Π = {∇C(q) : ∀q} is compact.
Because ρ(o) /∈ Π, there exists a hyperplane that strongly separates Π and ρ(o). In other words, there exists
an k > 0 such that ||ρ(o)−∇C(q)|| ≥ k.
When outcome o is realized, B(q) = ρ(o) · q − C(q) + C(0) is the market maker’s loss given q. We
have ∇B(q) = ρ(o) −∇C(q), which represents the instantaneous change of the market maker’s loss. For
infinitesimal ǫ, let q′ = q+ ǫ (ρ(o)−∇C(q)). Then,
B(q′) = B(q) +∇B(q) · [ǫ (ρ(o)−∇C(q))] = B(q) + ǫ||ρ(o)−∇C(q)||2 ≤ B(q) + ǫk2.
This shows that for any q we can find a q′ such that the market maker’s worst-case loss is at least increased
by ǫk2. This process can continue for infinite steps. Hence, we conclude that the market maker’s loss is
unbounded.
3.8 Proof of Proposition 2
This proof is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 3. The only major difference is that now C(0) =
−minx∈ΠR(x) instead of C(0) = −minx∈H(ρ(O))R(x), but this is equivalent since we have assumed that
∇C(0) ∈ H(ρ(O)). R(ρ(o)) is still well-defined and finite since we have assumed that H(ρ(O)) ⊆ Π.
3.9 Proof of Proposition 3
A trader looking to earn a guaranteed profit when the current quantity is q0 hopes to purchase a bundle r
so that the worst-case profit mino∈O ρ(o) · r− C(q0 + r) + C(q0) is as large as possible. Notice that this
quantity is strictly positive since r = 0, which always has 0 profit, is one option. Thus, a trader would like
to solve the following objective:
max
r∈RK
min
o∈O
ρ(o) · r− C(q0 + r) +C(q0)
= min
x∈H(ρ(O))
max
r∈RK
x · r− C(q0 + r) + C(q0)
= min
x∈H(ρ(O))
max
r∈RK
x · (q+ r)− C(q0 + r) + C(q0)− x · q0
= min
x∈H(ρ(O))
R(x) + C(q0)− x · q0
= min
x∈H(ρ(O))
R(x) + x0 · q0 −R(x0)− x · q0
≥ min
x∈H(ρ(O))
DR(x,x0).
The first equality with the min /max swap holds via Sion’s Minimax Theorem [24]. The last inequality was
obtained using the first-order optimality condition of the solution x0 = argmaxx∈Π x · q0 − R(x) for the
vector x− x0 which holds since x ∈ Π.
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